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IN HIS Disputed Questions De potentia, written about 1265/66, just
before the Summa theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas asked “whether there
can be a person in God” (utrum in Deo possit esse persona). His answer reads
as follows:
Person signifies a certain nature (quaedam natura) with a certain mode of
existing (quidam modus existendi ). Now, the nature which person includes
in its signification is the most worthy (dignissima) of all natures, namely,
the intellectual nature according to its genus; and likewise the mode of
existing signified by person is the most worthy (dignissimus), namely,
such that something be existing by itself ( per se existens). Therefore, since
all that is most worthy (dignissimum) in creatures should be attributed to
God, this name person can fittingly be attributed to God, like other
names which are said of God in a proper way.1
This short answer stresses the dignity of the person three times in the
superlative form: “most worthy, most exalted (dignissimum).” In this text,
the dignity that characterizes the person is first considered according to
the common signification of the name “person,” a common signification
that applies—by analogy—to human beings, to angels, and to the three
divine persons. This dignity consists of, not one, but two features.
The first feature is the intellectual nature. By “intellectual nature,”
Aquinas does not mean the act of understanding, but the essence of beings
endowed with the faculty of intellectual knowledge and, consequently, the
faculty of will (which implies free choice and the capacity of performing
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 3, corp.
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free acts). The accent is put first of all on the nature itself,2 and then on
the faculties or powers that belong to this nature: rationality also desig-
nates a faculty (the faculty of understanding and consequently the faculty
of will as “intellectual appetite”), but first, it characterizes a nature. The
second feature is what Aquinas here calls “a certain mode of existing”
(quidam modus existendi ), that is, existing by oneself ( per se existens), which
means subsistence as the mode of existence that properly belongs to first
substances: existing not in another, but in oneself and by oneself. As the
Summa theologiae explains: “Insofar as [the substance] exists by itself and
not in another ( per se existit et non in alio), it is called subsistence (subsis-
tentia).”3These are the two features that ground the dignity of the person,
namely, (1) subsistence as denoting the substance under the aspect of its
special mode of existing, and (2) intellectual nature. 
Finally, by dignity (“the greatest dignity”), in this context, Aquinas does
not mean something that comes to the person from the outside, as would
a special honor bestowed on a person by virtue of his or her high social
standing, but he means the excellent goodness that intrinsically character-
izes the person as such: “Dignity (dignitas) signifies someone’s goodness
(bonitas) on account of himself or herself ( propter seipsum).”4 Such dignity
of the person is not first of all a moral worth but a metaphysical worth
(which grounds the moral worth of the person).
The Person: Modern Views and the Patristic Tradition
This metaphysical understanding of the person in terms of substance
(subsistence) and nature is—to say the least—no longer common in our
culture. It is quite often dismissed, for several complex reasons into which
I cannot enter here. We can think, for instance, of Immanuel Kant, who
reduced the substance either to the thing inaccessible in itself, or to an
epistemological category—a schema of understanding (Schema des
Verstandesbegriffs ).5 The understanding of the person as a substance ceded
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2 ST III, q. 2, a. 2, corp.: “Person has a different meaning from nature. For nature signi-
fies the specific essence (essentia speciei ) which is signified by the definition.”
3 ST I, q. 29, a. 2, corp.
4 In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, qla 1, corp.
5 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Idem, Werke in sechs Bänden, vol. 2
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 191–92. The “schema” is,
in itself, “always a mere product of the imagination” (nur ein Produkt der Einbil-
dungskraft ), 189. Kant applied the same reduction to the notion of causality.
Whereas for Aquinas the wisdom and love of God are especially manifest by the
fact that God communicates to creatures a participation in his goodness by
giving them the dignity of being a cause (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, ch. 69; cf.
ST I, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2: “dignitas causalitatis”), Kant reduced causality to the 
its place to various conceptions that put the principal accent on the
subjective aspects of the person, either in terms of thought (a person is a
subject who thinks and who has self-consciousness),6 or in terms of
moral autonomy and freedom (to be a person is to be able to dispose
freely of oneself and to be autonomous in one’s action), or in terms of
relations (the person is then defined by his or her insertion into the
network of social relationships, or the person is understood as being
constituted by the otherness of other persons: “I exist only through an
other”), or in terms of forming projects, or again in terms of the capac-
ity to enjoy something, and so on.7
The concept of person in not an invention of Christian thought: it is
already found in classical Latin culture (with a social, moral, literary,
theatrical, and juridical background). But the Christian tradition certainly
offered a decisive contribution to the development of the understanding
of the person. Tertullian, at the beginning of the third century, was the
first Christian author who made systematic use of the word “persona.” He
did so in a Trinitarian context, in order to reject modalism, that is, the
heterodox view that considered the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit just as
three modes of manifestation of a God who, in himself, would be without
distinction. The affirmation of “three divine persons” aimed precisely to
maintain, against modalism, that the tri-personal “disposition” that appears
in the history of salvation exists in the very reality of God. To speak of
“person,” from the beginning of the Trinitarian use of this word, is to
signify the being that exists truly in itself, the reality that underlies the
manifestation to others, the foundation of what appears in the action. To
say, for instance, that the Son of God is a “person” is to affirm that he has
a proper existence or subsistence in himself, that he is not confused with
the Father. A similar purpose inspired the development of the Trinitarian
concept of hypostasis in the East, notably in Origen. Much later, in the
eighth century, St. John Damascene summarized the Eastern patristic
tradition by explaining that the hypostasis signifies “that which is and
which subsists by itself.”8 In sum, in Trinitarian and Christological
contexts, the person or hypostasis is a distinct subsisting reality endowed
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“schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding” (der Schematismus der
reinen Verstandesbegriffe): Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 192.
6 See Philip Dixon, “Nice and Hot Disputes”: The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seven-
teenth Century (London: T. & T. Clark, 2003). 
7 For an overview and a critical discussion of these conceptions, see L’humain et la
personne, ed. François-Xavier Putallaz and Bernard N. Schumacher (Paris: Cerf,
2009).
8 John Damascene, Dialectica, ch. 43, in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol.
1, ed. Bonifatius Kotter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), 108. 
with a proper mode of existing. The person as a substance is defined fore-
most by its distinct existence in itself and through itself.9
The Metaphysical Understanding of the Person
On this basis, Christian reflection has progressively elaborated an under-
standing of the person that applies to the Triune God (and therefore to
Christ Jesus) as well as to human beings and to angels. This analogical
understanding of what a person is found an important expression in the
well-known definition given by Boethius at the end of Antiquity: “A
person is an individual substance of rational nature (naturae rationabilis
individua substantia).”10 According to St. Thomas’s interpretation of
Boethius, the person is defined by the integration of the following three
features: (1) individuality; (2) substance; (3) a nature defined by and
endowed with intelligence and will.
1. The individual, by definition, signifies that which is “undivided” in
itself (one in itself) and which is also distinct from others (one with
comparison to others). To speak of the individual is to signify the
singular in its distinction and undividedness. St. Thomas specifies:
“ ‘Individual’ (individuum) is included in the definition of the person
in order to designate the individual mode of being (individualem
modum essendi ).”11This means that, in Aquinas’s understanding of the
definition given by Boethius, the word “individual” means the incom-
municable manner of existing of the real singular, the irreducibility of
the singular’s uniqueness.
2. The “individual” can apply to accidents, but it finds its supreme real-
ization in the substance. The “substance” designates what stands
beneath the accidents; and, by extension, it designates that which is
apt to exist through itself, in itself and not in another, that is to say,
subsistence. When discussing whether, in the definition of the person,
substance refers to the first substance or to the second substance
(“second substance” signifies the “nature of the genus absolutely in
itself,” while “first substance” signifies “that nature as subsisting indi-
9 See La personne et le christianisme ancien, ed. Bernard Meunier (Paris: Cerf, 2006).
10 Boethius, Treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius, ch. 3 (PL 64, col. 1343).
11 St. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 5. Cf. ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4: when
applied to the divine persons, who are not individualized by matter, “individual”
only implies incommunicability (incommunicabilitas). See Lawrence Dewan, “The
Individual as a Mode of Being according to Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 63
(1997): 403–24.
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vidually”), Aquinas insists that the division of substance into “first” and
“second” substance should not be taken as a division into genus and
species, but rather as a division according to “different modes of
being” (secundum diversos modos essendi ), since this division is analo-
gous. And, here again, Aquinas makes this important clarification: “In
this way, person is contained in the genus of substance, although not
as a species, but as determining a special mode of existing (ut specialem
modum existendi determinans).”12 This applies by analogy to God, not
that God would be contained in the genus of substance (God is
beyond any genus), but insofar as God is the principle of the genus
of substance.13
According to this explanation, the “individual substance” signifies
the individual whose “special mode of existence” is to subsist through
itself and in itself. Since the person is an individual substance, it is a real-
ity that possesses its proper being in a complete manner, in itself and
through itself, and which exercises on its own the act of existing. What
is at stake in this explanation can be expressed in the following way:
what accounts for my uniqueness is not only my concrete individual
essence (my own humanity), but my proper act of existing in the
human nature common to all human beings. Thus, the “individual
substance” signifies the subsisting singular that exists through itself and
in itself, according to an irreducible mode, as a complete whole, a
“hypostasis” that exercises the act of existing on its own account.
3. The third element of the definition of the person is rational nature, that
is to say, the essence of beings endowed with intelligence. Here we must
add that rationality implies, as a constitutive feature, will and freedom:
the will itself as a free inclination, and free choice.14 Free will is the
characteristic of beings endowed with intelligence: they are not merely
12 De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 6. 
13 De potentia, q. 9, a. 3, ad 3. When applied to the divine persons, “substance” does
not mean what underlies the accidents (since there are no accidents in God), but
it means subsistence, that is, substance insofar as it exists in itself and by itself (ST
I, q. 29, a. 2, corp.; a. 3, ad 4). Faced with the objection that Boethius’s definition
of the person is unfitting since the divine essence itself is an “individual
substance,” Aquinas replies: “In the definition of the person, individual signifies
that which is not predicated of several; and in this sense the divine essence is not
an ‘individual substance’ by predication, inasmuch as it is predicated of several
persons (non est individua substantia secundum praedicationem, cum praedicetur de
pluribus personis)” (De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 12).
14 De veritate, q. 23, a. 1, corp.: “In an intellectual nature, in which something is
received altogether immaterially, the essence of a free inclination is found 
Person, Subsistence, and Nature 995
“propelled” toward an end to attain, but instead they have the capacity
to direct themselves freely, by their will, toward the end that they have
apprehended by their mind.15 This is the ultimate determination that
makes of an individual substance a person: a nature endowed with the
power of understanding the truth and of loving the good (not only
particular goods, but the universal good).16The rational nature is a prin-
ciple of being and of acting. Free action is the clearest manifestation of
such rational nature, insofar as action follows upon being. Put other-
wise, rational nature blossoms and makes itself known by the voluntary
command of acts, which has its root in the mind, insofar as these facul-
ties belong to the nature itself. By virtue of this nature, the human
person possesses the ability to relate to the world, to others, to himself
or herself, and to God through knowledge and love. The interpersonal
dimension that characterizes the person is precisely inscribed within this
rational nature. I will return to this below.
In this view, the person is neither a thinking being nor a being that is
immediately apt to think or to will, but a being who exists in a nature that
is essentially defined by rationality (which applies to all human beings,
including severely handicapped people who will perhaps never be able to
think or to form projects).
Of course, this metaphysical understanding of the person is not the
first thing we notice in our experience of being “persons.” It is not spon-
taneous, but we discern it by reflecting on the immediate given of our
experience, that is, on the objects of our acts, and on our acts themselves,
so as to discern what lies at the root of these acts. At the root of free
action, of knowledge, and of self-consciousness, at the root of our rela-
tions with other people and creatures, we discover a being that holds itself
in existence, that is to say, the deep reality that is the radical principle of
knowledge, of free action, of openness to others, and of relations. The
metaphysical understanding of the person shows that we are open to the
real, open to being—open not just sometimes at some moments of our
lives, but open by our nature, by what we are.
perfectly verified; and this free inclination constitutes the essential character of
will (quae quidem libera inclinatio rationem voluntatis constituit ).”
ST I, q. 83, a. 4, corp.: “Within the intellective appetite, the will (voluntas) and
free choice (liberum arbitrium), which is nothing other than the power of choos-
ing (vis electiva), bear the same relation to one another as, within the intellective
apprehension, the intellect (intellectus) and reason (ratio).” 
15 ST I, q. 29, a. 1, corp.
16 ST I, q. 59, a. 1, corp. and ad 1; q. 64, a. 2, corp.
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This metaphysical approach, it should be clear, excludes neither the
psychological, moral, and relational features of the person nor the impor-
tance of action. Rather, it enables one to integrate these aspects, and it
guarantees their foundation. One can observe this, for example, in the
teaching of the Third Council of Constantinople (in 680–681). In the
wake of Chalcedon, this Council stressed the unity of Christ’s person
(Christ is one and the same hypostasis or person), and it paid special atten-
tion to the full integrity of his human nature, consisting of a rational soul
and a body ( psuche ˜ logike ˜kai som˜a, according to the dogmatic definition
of Chalcedon). The document by which this Third Council of Constan-
tinople addressed its results to the emperor explains that, since Christ
assumed a true human nature ( phusis) he exercises a true human activity
(energeia). The document then specifies: “Nothing other constitutes the
perfection of the human substance (anthrop˜ine ˜ousia) than the essential
will (ousiod˜es thelem˜a) by which the power of free choice (autexousiotès) is
inscribed in us.”17
Established on a solid metaphysics of the person/hypostasis, the
Church’s doctrine regarding Christ Jesus was led to place the will and free-
dom of action at the heart of the understanding of human nature—a deter-
mination that had the greatest importance for the development of the
notion of person in Christian culture. And this is precisely what the
theme of the imago Dei expresses, as St. Thomas explains in the prologue
of the second part of his Summa theologiae (this prologue specifies the
aspect under which moral theology studies the human being): “The
human being has been created to the image of God,” which means that
the human being “is endowed with intelligence and free will, and has the
power to act by itself.” In this way, Christian theology elaborated a
conception of the person marked by proper subsistence, individuality,
unity, and totality, as well as by an intelligent and free nature. 
Divine Persons and Human Persons
According to Aquinas, the divine persons are distinguished and consti-
tuted by relations, and they are indeed relations: the divine person is a
“subsisting relation.”18 But, according to St. Thomas, this is not the case
17 Greek text with Latin translation in Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio,
ed. J. D. Mansi, vol. 11 (Paris: H. Welter, 1901), col. 663–64. The Latin translation
reads: “Nihil enim aliud constituit humanae substantiae integritatem, nisi essentialis
voluntas, per quam liberi arbitrii vigor in nobis designatur” (col. 663).
18 The divine person is a subsistent relation (ST I, q. 40, a. 2, ad 1: “personae sunt ipsae
relationes subsistentes”); and the name “person” signifies the relation as subsisting (ST
I, q. 29, a. 4, corp.: “persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem”).
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with human persons: I am neither a relation nor a set of relations. The
constitution of a person by a relation remains the exclusive prerogative of
the Trinity, because only in God does a relation “subsist.”19 In a human
being, a relation does not constitute the person as such. However, many
Christian philosophers and theologians today ask: why shouldn’t we
apply the understanding of the person in terms of relations to human
persons? An answer to this question can be found in Aquinas’s distinction
between the common notion of the person, and the special notion that
applies distinctly to God and to humans.
There is, first, a common notion of person that is applied by analogy to the
divine Three, to angels, and to human beings. This common notion, which
is analogical, is expressed by the definition of Boethius. And there is, second,
a special notion of person that is applied distinctly either to human beings, or
to God the Trinity. This special notion can be expressed either “formally”
( formaliter), so as to signify what belongs the ratio of the person, or “materi-
ally” (materialiter): such “material signification” includes that which accounts
for the distinct individuality and uniqueness of one person.20
The “principle of individuation,” so to say, among the divine persons,21
is a relation, to the point that St. Thomas explains, concerning the divine
person of the Son of God: “The Son is a subsisting person by virtue of his
relation [namely, filiation]: for his relation is his characteristic personhood
(sua enim relatio est sua personalitas).”22To the objection: “No substance is a
relation,” Aquinas gives the following answer: “The divine essence is not
in the genus of substance, but is, rather, above every genus, embracing in
itself the perfections of all genera. This is why nothing prevents one from
finding that which pertains to relation within it.”23
For its part, the human person is composed of a rational soul and a
body. The substantial unity of this body and this soul constitutes one
human person. According to the special notion that characterizes it, the
human person is a substantial existent of an intelligent and free nature,
19 ST I, q. 39, a. 1, ad 1.
20 De potentia, q. 9, a. 4, corp.: “We must observe that a thing is signified in two ways,
formally and materially. Formally a name signifies that which it was chiefly
intended to signify, and this is the ratio of the name: thus ‘man’ signifies some-
thing composed of a body and a rational soul. Materially a name signifies that
which is required for such ratio (illud in quo talis ratio salvatur): thus ‘man’ signifies
something that has a heart, brain, and such parts as required in order that the
body be animated with a rational soul.” 
21 Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. IV, ch. 14 (no. 3503): “Id quod est quasi individuatio-
nis principium.” 
22 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.
23 De potentia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1.
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individualized by and subsisting in matter.24 According to this view, the
matter is the “principle of standing under” ( principium substandi ), whereas
the form (in our case, the human rational soul) is the “principle of
subsisting” ( principium subsistendi )25—so that the soul accounts for the
subsistence without which there could be no substantial individual.
This is not to imply that relations have no importance in such an
understanding of the human person. First of all, a relation to God is
implied by the very existence of the human person as created by God,26 a
relation that necessarily follows on the being of the creature (this relation
to God is a “proper accident” belonging to the genus of “relation”), with
real ontological weight.27 Second, relations are constitutive of the human
person if we consider the human nature insofar as it implies family rela-
tions, social life, mutual help, and the development of the image of God
in the human person. Aquinas accounts for these interpersonal relations
(as he accounts for human language) by considering the rational nature
that grounds them:
24 The principle of individuation is “signed matter” (matter as referred to definite
quantity and dimension). “Signed matter” individuates form, and consequently
(together with the form) the individual substance composed of matter and form.
Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. IV, ch. 40 (#3781): “The singular is individuated by
designated matter (materia designata) which is not included in the quiddity and
nature of the species. For, in designating Socrates, one includes this matter (haec
materia), which is not included in the ratio of human nature. Therefore, every
hypostasis subsisting in human nature is constituted by signed matter (materia
signata).” Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. I, ch. 65 (no. 531): “Singularis autem essentia
constituitur ex materia designata et forma individuata.”
25 ST I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 5. In De potentia, q. 9, a. 5, ad 13, Aquinas writes that the indi-
viduating principles ( principia individuantia) are both the principle of subsisting—
since a nature does not subsist except in singular beings—and the principle of
distinction from other individuals of the same species. And, in ST I, q. 29, a. 4,
corp., he explains: “Person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature:
thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are
the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to the
signification of ‘person’ [in general], nevertheless do belong to the signification
of [a particular] human person.”
26 De potentia, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1: “Although the first cause that is God does not enter
into the essence of creatures, yet esse which is in creatures cannot be understood
except as derived from the divine esse: even as a proper effect ( proprius effectus)
cannot be understood save as derived from its proper cause.”
27 ST I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1; q. 45, a. 3, ad 1. Cf. In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4: “If
‘creation’ is taken in the passive sense, it is a certain accident in the creature, and
so it signifies a certain reality which is not in the predicament of passion, prop-
erly speaking, but in the genus of relation (in genere relationis).”
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The divine providence disposes rational creatures in a different way from
other beings, because they differ from other beings in the way that their
own nature was established. . . . Since they have an intellectual nature,
they are able by their operation to attain to intelligible truth. . . . And
because they can reach intelligible truth by their natural operation, it is
clear that divine provision is made for them in a different way than for
other things. Inasmuch as the human being is given understanding and
reason, by which he can both discern and investigate the truth; as he is
also given sensory powers, both internal and external, whereby he is
helped to seek the truth; as he is also given the use of speech, by which
he is enabled to convey to another person the truth that he conceives in
his mind—thus constituted, human beings may help one another in the
process of knowing the truth, just as they may in regard to the other
needs of life, for man is by nature a social animal.28
Speech is proper to human beings, since it is proper to them, in
contrast with other animals, to have knowledge of good and evil, just
and unjust, and the like [the useful and the harmful], which speech can
signify. . . . Therefore, human beings by nature communicate about these
things. And communication about these things makes the household
and the political community, so that the human being is by nature (natu-
raliter) a social (domesticum) and political (civile) animal.29
These quotations from Aquinas could be developed, but they are enough
to show that, for him, our interpersonal relations are grounded in our
nature. They are, so to speak, the blossoming of our nature—to be more
precise: these relations are grounded in the “rational nature” that is part of
the very definition of the person, a rational nature which in turn finds its
foundation in the subsistence of the person as an “individual substance.”
Finally, let us briefly consider a problem posed by the Church’s
doctrine on the Trinity and on Christ. Christian monotheism holds that,
in God the Trinity, the three persons are one understanding and one will,
one freedom, exercising one operation as they are one identical essence or
nature: one single God. Consequently, if one defines the person solely by
reason, or freedom, or the capacity for autonomous action, how can we
recognize “three persons” in God? This would imply three intelligences,
three freedoms, three centers of spiritual life, in brief, three Gods (trithe-
ism). This is far from a false or superficial difficulty. It has been vividly
perceived by Christian theologians ever since the seventeenth century
when, with John Locke and René Descartes, the person began to be
understood in terms of acts of thought. The problem is found also in
28 Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, ch. 147 (no. 3201–3202); emphasis mine.
29 Sententia Libri Politicorum, Bk. I, ch. 1/b (Leonine edition, vol. 48 A, p. 79);
emphasis mine. 
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Christology: how can we profess that Christ Jesus is “one single person”
while recognizing in him a true and complete human mind (with intelli-
gence and will) that remains really distinct from his intelligent and free
divinity? To define the person by the life of the mind would lead one to
posit two persons in Christ. Attempts during the twentieth century to
speak of three “modes of being” (Seinsweisen) in God the Trinity (Karl
Barth), or to specify the “personality” of the Three by the notion of
“distinct modes of subsistence” (distinkte Subsistenzweisen) (Karl Rahner),
did not solve the problem. In fact, the theologians who made such propos-
als adopted a conception of the human person based on the life of the
mind, so that the analogy with the divine persons became quite obscure.
St. Thomas’s understanding of the person still offers today a helpful
resource for pursuing Christian reflection on the human being and on the
Triune God. It places the metaphysical foundation of the person in the
foreground. 30 This foundation is at the root of the dignity of the person.
The person is “what is most worthy” (dignissimum) and “what is most
perfect ( perfectissimum)”31 by reason of its mode of existing through itself
as a substance of an intellectual nature. Being a substance is the most
fundamental dignity of the person. The human person is not a “rational
individual,” but a subsisting being of a rational nature. The criterion for the
dignity of a person is not only of the moral order, but it is—more funda-
mentally—of the metaphysical order. The criterion is the possession, not
of a property or of a set of properties, but of a nature; and not just any
possession, but the person’s existence as a substance of this nature. This
approach to the person, in terms of subsistence and of nature, grounds and
promotes the psychological, ethical, relational, and social traits of the
person. Further, this approach constitutes the indispensable foundation for
understanding analogically the divine person and the human person, that is,
for a consistent account of the human person and of the divine person by
way of analogy: “It is because subsisting in a rational nature is a great dignity
that every individual of a rational nature is called a person.”32 N&V
30 “Metaphysical” should in no way be confused with “conceptual.” Metaphysics
deals with being as being, with the real as real, that is, with what is at the heart
of all reality.
31 ST I, q. 29, a. 3, corp.
32 ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2 (emphasis mine): “Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali
natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona.”
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